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Abstract
This paper concludes that, when offenders are wealth constrained and the gov-
ernment is resource constrained and can commit to a certain policy throughout
the whole planning horizon, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather than
increasing, in the number of offenses. By extending the framework, suggested in
Emons (2003), to n-periods setting, we prove that for the agents who may commit
an act several times, optimal sanctions are such that the fine for the first crime
equals the offender’s entire wealth, and the fines are zero for all the subsequent
crimes. This result contradicts the widely prevailing escalating penalties imbedded
in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines. In addition, analogous to Emons
(2004), this scheme does not appear to be a time consistent (subgame perfect)
strategy for the government in an n-periods setting. Moreover, we show that, if the
government cannot commit, equal rather than decreasing sanctions will be optimal.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we concentrate on policies for crime control that are not only aimed at
reducing the number of violations but are also cost minimizing from the point of view of
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the regulator. Unfortunately, these two objectives conflict with each other. Reduction
of expenditures on crime control will lead to a lower deterrence rate and vice versa.
However, both objectives seem to be very important for society. Society is better off
when both the number of violations and the costs of crime control are reduced.
Another important question addressed in this paper is whether the optimal sanction
scheme should be decreasing or increasing in the number of offenses. For the law and
economics literature on optimal law enforcement, escalating sanction schemes, embedded
in most sentencing guidelines, are still a puzzle. Garoupa (1997) or Polinsky and Shavell
(2000) give excellent surveys of this literature.
The purpose of this study is to find the optimal penalty scheme which takes into ac-
count the two objectives, mentioned above. We study the problem of optimal sanctions
for repeat offenders in a multi-periods model employing the two-periods framework sug-
gested in Emons (2003). We assume that agents may commit a crime several times. The
criminal act is inefficient, it causes harm for society; the agents are thus to be deterred.
An important assumption of the model is that the agents are wealth constrained so that
increasing the fine for the first offence means a reduction in the possible sanction for
the subsequent offences and vice versa. A simplification compared to Emons (2003) is
that in the forward looking solution we consider only history independent strategies of
the agents. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension and the
number of crimes, since it is costly for society.
The main result is that the optimal penalty scheme is decreasing in the number of
offenses. We find that it is optimal to set the sanction for the first detected offense equal
to the entire wealth of the agent while the sanctions for all the subsequent offenses equal
zero.
In this paper we discuss a general set up with representative offender and regulator
whose aim is to block violations of law. However, it is clear that a similar framework can
be applied in case of an antitrust authority dealing with a group of firms that form an
illegal cartel. Antitrust law violations often are committed repeatedly by the same firm.
Remarkably, sentencing guidelines in both US and Europe attach a higher gravity factor
to recidivistic violations and, hence, prescribe to punish repeated offenders more heavily.
Clearly, this does not go in line with the main results of the Emons (2003) work and our
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analysis. This puzzle still requires deep investigation in the law and economics literature.
From the other point of view, our model, where offenders are wealth constrained, captures
another important feature of current penalty schemes, namely, the existence of upper
bound for the fine. Usually, this upper bound is given by either 10% of overall turnover
of enterprise or by fixed monetary amount. The motivation for existence of this rule can
be connected to the fact that antitrust authorities should not force firms to go bankrupt,
in other words, the fact that firms are wealth constrained is taken into account.
We start the discussion with a review of the related literature. Rubinstein (1980)
considers a setup where an agent can commit two crimes. A high penalty for the second
crime is exogenously given. Rubinstein shows that for any set of parameters there exists
a utility function such that deterrence is higher if the sanction for the first crime is lower
than the sanction for the second crime. Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) develop a
dynamic model with repeated offenses. They studied how prior offenses should affect the
probability of detection rather than the level of punishments. In Polinsky and Rubinfeld
(1991) it was found that it may be optimal ( for some parameter values ) to punish repeat
offenders more severely, when the government cannot observe illicit gains from criminal
activities.
In Burnovski and Safra (1994) agents decide on the optimal number of crimes. They
show that reducing the sanctions on subsequent crimes while increasing the penalty on
previous crimes will reduce the overall criminal activity, if the probability of detection
is sufficiently small. Our analysis is very similar to their paper. They also consider an
n-periods framework. The main difference is that they search for the most deterring
sequential policy for repeat offenders without taking into account that the regulator also
has an objective to minimize the enforcement costs.
In Polinsky and Shavell (1998) agents live for two periods and can commit a crime
twice. Their result is that young first-time offenders and old-second time offenders are
penalized with the maximum sanction. Dana (2001) argues that, contrary to what is
frequently assumed in the literature, probabilities of detection increase for repeat offend-
ers. As a result, the optimal deterrence model a la Becker dictates declining, rather than
escalating, penalties for repeat offenders.
Finally, the paper by Emons (2003) studies a two-period model, where agents may
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commit a crime two times. One important assumption of his model is that the agents are
wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offence means a reduction in the
possible sanction for subsequent offences and vice versa. He also assumes that, besides
crime deterrence, the main objective of the regulator is minimization of enforcement
costs. The paper concludes that the optimal penalty structure should be declining in the
number of offenses.
To summarize the results of earlier papers we conclude that the main argument in
favor of decreasing penalty schemes is that probabilities of detection, usually, increase for
repeat offenders and then Becker’s model implies declining sanctions. The main policy
implication from this analysis would be that sanctions should be declining when the
regulator is resource constrained and offenders are wealth constrained. On the other
hand, it is intuitively clear that recidivistic behavior should be punished more severely
than first time offences or crimes committed by accident, since it usually signals a more
grave criminal intent. With respect to policy implications, this scheme should be applied
when the government cannot observe illicit gains from criminal activities1.
In this paper we first analyze an n-period repeated game, where the regulator’s main
objective is to block any violations of law and, at the same time, to minimize the costs of
crime control. We describe a forward looking solution, i.e. the regulator can commit to a
certain policy from the beginning of the game and does not change the parameters of the
penalty scheme ( fine and probability of control) till the end of the planning horizon. The
solution of this problem gives the desired result of complete deterrence. Even the first
crime never happens, unless benefits from crime are much higher than the initial wealth
of the offender. In the model of section 2 we rule out this possibility. The main intuition
that drives this result comes from the fact that the agent pays the sanction for the first
offence with probability p (rate of law enforcement). While any further sanction will be
paid with lower probability, since the second offence can be detected only conditional
on the fact that the first offence has been discovered. Hence, since paying the first fine
is more likely than paying any subsequent fine, shifting resources from the last periods
to the first increases deterrence for given rate of law enforcement. Consequently, as in
Emons (2003), p is minimized by putting all scarce resources into the penalty for the first
1See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991).
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detected offence.
However, the outcome will be different in case the regulator follows a time consistent
(subgame perfect) strategy. This implies that the government is able to change its policy
every period, conditioning its choice on the outcome of the preceding periods. In this
case the regulator chooses the optimal subgame perfect action in the beginning of each
period. In section 3 we show that the scheme derived as a forward looking solution in case
of full commitment is not a time consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for the regulator
in a multi-period setting. Section 4 concludes.
2 Multi-period Model, Forward Looking Solution (Full
Commitment Case)
We consider a multi-period optimization problem of a cost minimizing regulator (antitrust
authority or police ) whose aim it is to block violations of law (for example, violations of
antitrust law, violations of criminal law, violations of pollution standards).
We consider a continuum of potential offenders which has measure 1. Individuals or
firms live for n periods. In each period the agents can engage in an illegal activity, such
as polluting the environment, evading taxes, or violating competition law. If an agent
commits the act in either period he receives a monetary benefit b > 0. Following Polinsky
and Rubinfeld (1991) b is the illicit gain and the crime creates no acceptable gain. The
act causes a monetary harm h > 0 to society and, thus, has to be deterred. We assume
that the following inequality is satisfied, h > b. So, the act is not socially desirable.
To achieve deterrence the government chooses sanctions and a probability of appre-
hension. The regulator cannot tell in which period of its life the individual is. It can only
observe the information after the crime has been discovered. Hence, the regulator only
observes whether the crime is the first or second or nth one. Accordingly, the government
applies fines s1, s2, ..., sn ≥ 0, where si is the penalty in case the offense by this particular
agent is recorded by the authority already i times. Moreover, the government chooses
a rate of law enforcement, p, which can also be seen as the probability of conviction.
We assume that p is the same for all (first time and repeated) offenses. Since apprehen-
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sion is costly, the government wishes to minimize p and reduce the number of crimes.
The overall objective of the regulator is to minimize the number of crimes. Subject to
that objective being reached, the regulator aims to minimize costs of control, p. So, the
objective function of the regulator can be written as max − (p + Hk) , where p is the
probability of control (or rate of law enforcement), k is the number of crimes, and H
is the disutility from crime for the regulator, which is assumed to be a large positive
number.
The agents are risk neutral and maximize expected income. They have initial wealth
W and hold it over all n periods unless the government interferes with sanctions. Benefits
from crime b are consumed immediately, and the maximum of what the government can
extract from the agents is W .2 Moreover, based on Becker’s (1968) maximum fine result,
we assume that in order to minimize p the government will use the agent’s entire wealth for
sanctions. This implies that the fines s1, s2, ..., sn have to satisfy the ”budget constraint”
n∑
i=1
si = W. To simplify the analysis we also assume no discounting.
An agent chooses the number of crime that can be committed or, in other words, he
(she) can choose between following strategies:
Not to commit a criminal act (i.e. not to participate in a cartel) at all. Then the
utility from this strategy for the ”offender” has the following form U(0, 0, ..., 0) = W.
Commit crime (collude) only once in any of the periods.
The utility from this strategy for the offender equals U(1, 0, ..., 0) = W + b− ps1.
Commit crime in any two periods: U(1, 1, 0, ..., 0) = W+b−ps1+b−p(1−p)s1−p2s2.
Commit crime in any three periods: U(1, 1, 1, ..., 0) = U(0, 1, 1, 1, ..., 0) = U(0, 0, ..., 0, 1, 1, 1) =
W + b− ps1 + b− p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 + b− (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3.
...................................................
Commit crime in all n periods:
U(1, 1, 1, ..., 1) = W + b− ps1+ b− p(1− p)s1− p2s2+ b− (1− p)2ps1− 2p2(1− p)s2−
p3s3 + .......+ b− (C0n−1(1− p)n−1ps1 + C1n−1(1− p)n−2p2s2 + C2n−1(1− p)n−3p3s3 + ....+
2This assumption seems to be not quite realistic. In most of the cases, for example in case of tax
evasion or illegal price-fixing activities, the penalty takes in to account not only initial wealth of the firm
but also accumulated rents from illegal activities. However, this assumption is adopted here to focus on
obtaining analytical results with respect to establishing an optimal sequence of sanctions.
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Cn−2n−1(1− p)pn−1sn−1 + Cn−1n−1pnsn),
where coefficients of these polynomials are formed according to the following formula:
Ckh =
h!
k!(h− k)! , h ≥ k.
To clarify the notation:
b− ps1 is the expected benefit from the first detected crime
b− p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 is the expected benefit from the second detected crime
b− (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3 is the expected benefit from the third detected
crime
b− (C0n−1(1− p)n−1ps1 + C1n−1(1− p)n−2p2s2 + C2n−1(1− p)n−3p3s3 + .... + Cn−2n−1(1−
p)pn−1sn−1 + Cn−1n−1p
nsn) is the expected benefit from n
th detected crime.
We impose the following assumptions on the parameters 0 < p < 1, b > 0,W > 0.
The possibility p = 0 does not make sense, since then there is no threat for the agent to
be convicted and no way to prove the criminal to be guilty.
We also assume here that agents have enough wealth so that deterrence is always
possible, i.e., nb <
n∑
i=1
si ≤ W . Further, we derive sanctions that give the agents the
proper incentives not to engage in criminal activities in either period. This means,
we derive a penalty scheme which ensures U(1, 0, ..., 0) < U(0, 0, ..., 0), U(1, 1, ..., 0) <
U(0, 0, ..., 0), ..., U(1, 1, ..., 1) < U(0, 0, ..., 0). These are included as constraints in the
optimization model. The main objective of the regulator is crime prevention and mini-
mization of costs of law enforcement, i.e. minimization of p. This leads to the following
model.
The aim of the regulator to prevent crime and to minimize the enforcement costs is
reflected in the objective function (1) below, while the aim to provide incentives for the
agents not to commit any crime is reflected in incentive constraints (2)-(n+1).
min p+Hk (1)
s.t.
b− ps1 5 0 (2)
2b− ps1 − p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 5 0 (3)
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3b− ps1 − p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 − (1− p)2ps1 − 2p2(1− p)s2 − p3s3 5 0 (4)
.............................................................................................................................
lb−
l∑
h=1
h∑
k=1
Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk 5 0 (l+1)
.............................................................................................................................
nb−
n∑
h=1
h∑
k=1
Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk 5 0 (n+1)
s1 + s2 + .....+ sn−1 5 W (n+2)
s1 ≥ 0, s2 ≥ 0, ...., sn−1 ≥ 0, p > 0. (n+3)
The Lagrangian for this problem has the following form:
L = −p−
n∑
j=1
λj[jb−
j∑
h=1
h∑
k=1
Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk]− λ∗( s1 + s2 + ....+ sn−1 − w) (5)
Using Kuhn-Tucker conditions to solve the minimization problem (1)-(n+3), we ob-
tain the result stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal cost minimizing sanction scheme sets the penalty for the
first detected violation equal to the entire wealth of the agent and for all subsequent
violations the penalties will be equal to zero, i.e. s∗1 = W and s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0.
The probability of law enforcement is constant over time and equals p∗, which represents
the smallest positive solution of the polynomial of order n in p, given by expression (19).
The proof of Proposition 1 consists of several steps: first, we derive FOCs and com-
plementary slackness conditions of the minimization problem described above; second,
based on the FOCs we prove Lemma 2, which states that inequality ∂L
∂sl
> ∂L
∂sl+1
holds
for any time period l ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}; finally, applying Lemma 2 and the complemen-
tary slackness conditions we obtain the optimal penalty schedule with s∗1 = W and
s∗2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0 and p > 0.
8
Proof. To derive the FOCs we take partial derivatives of expression (5) with re-
spect to all n − 1 variables, which denote the penalties in the corresponding periods.
Recall that, taking into account that the budget constraint must be binding, sn can be
expressed through all the unknowns and initial wealth as follows sn = W −
n−1∑
i=1
si. So,
differentiating and simplifying the expressions, we obtain n − 1 FOCs with respect to
penalties in corresponding periods (6)-(10) and one FOC with respect to the probability
of law enforcement (15). We also write down n+ 1 complementary-slackness conditions
in expressions (11)-(14) below.
∂L
∂s1
= p(1−p)0
n∑
i=k+1
λi+
n−1∑
k=1
[C0kp(1−p)k(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]−λnpn−λ∗ ≤ 0 (= 0 if s1 > 0) (6)
∂L
∂s2
=
n−1∑
k=1
[C1kp
2(1− p)k−1(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]− λnpn − λ∗ ≤ 0 (= 0 if s2 > 0) (7)
∂L
∂s3
=
n−1∑
k=2
[C2kp
3(1− p)k−2(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]− λnpn − λ∗ ≤ 0 (= 0 if s3 > 0) (8)
.....................................................................................................................................
∂L
∂sl
=
n−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1−p)k−(l−1)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]−λnpn−λ∗ ≤ 0 (= 0 if sl > 0) (9)
.....................................................................................................................................
∂L
∂sn−1
=
n−1∑
k=n−2
[Cn−2k p
n−1(1−p)k−(n−2)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]−λnpn−λ∗ ≤ 0 (= 0 if sn−1 > 0) (10)
Complementary slackness conditions are:
λ1 ≥ 0 ( λ1 ∗ (2) = 0 ) (11)
λ2 ≥ 0 ( λ2 ∗ (3) = 0 ) (12)
............................................................................................................
λn ≥ 0 ( λn ∗ (n+ 1) = 0 ) (13)
λ∗ ≥ 0 ( λ∗ ∗ (
n−1∑
i=1
si −W ) = 0 ) (14)
∂L
∂p
= 0. (15)
Next, we prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 For any l ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} , ∂L
∂sl
> ∂L
∂sl+1
.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on mathematical induction.
1. First, we show that the result stated in Lemma 2 holds in case the number of
periods equals to three, i.e. n = 3.
We take n = 3, which implies that k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and l ∈ {1, 2}.
Consequently, for l = 1, we obtain from (6) and (7) that
∂L
∂s1
− ∂L
∂s2
= p(1−p)0
3∑
i=1
λi+
2∑
k=1
[C0kp(1−p)k(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
2∑
k=1
[C1kp
2(1−p)k−1(
3∑
i=k+1
λi)] =
= pλ1 + 2p(1− p)λ2 + (p2 − 2p+ 1)λ3 > 0
Similarly, for l = 2, we obtain from (7) and (8) that
∂L
∂s2
− ∂L
∂s3
=
2∑
k=1
[C1kp
2(1− p)k−1(
3∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
2∑
k=2
[C2kp
3(1− p)k−2(
3∑
i=k+1
λi)] =
= C11p
2(
3∑
i=2
λi)+C
1
2p
2(1−p)1λ3−C22p3λ3 = p2(
3∑
i=2
λi)+2p
2λ3−3p3λ3 = p2λ2+3p2(1−p)λ3 > 0.
2. Next, we show that the result stated in Lemma 2 holds for any arbitrary number
of periods. For that purpose we show that if the result of Lemma 2 holds for n = m,
then it also holds for n = m+ 1.
Now, assume that
∂L
∂sl
− ∂L
∂sl+1
=
m−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)(
m∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
m−1∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1− p)k−l(
m∑
i=k+1
λi)] > 0
(16)
is true for any 1 < l ≤ n when n = m .
Based on this we have to prove that
n−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
n−1∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1− p)k−l(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)] > 0
is true for any 1 < l ≤ n when n = m+ 1. Clearly,
m∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)(
m+1∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
m∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1− p)k−l(
m+1∑
i=k+1
λi)] =
10
=
m−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1−p)k−(l−1)(
m+1∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
m−1∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1−p)k−l(
m+1∑
i=k+1
λi)]+C
l−1
m p
l(1−p)m−(l−1)λm+1)−
−C lmpl+1(1− p)m−lλm+1 =
=
m−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1−p)k−(l−1)(
m∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
m−1∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1−p)k−l(
m∑
i=k+1
λi)]+λm+1
m−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1−p)k−(l−1)]−
−λm+1
m−1∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1− p)k−l] + C l−1m pl(1− p)m−(l−1)λm+1 − C lmpl+1(1− p)m−lλm+1 =
=
m−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)(
m∑
i=k+1
λi)]−
m−1∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1− p)k−l(
m∑
i=k+1
λi)]+ (17)
+λm+1
{
m∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)]−
m∑
k=l
[C lkp
l+1(1− p)k−l]
}
> 0. (18)
Expression (17) is positive due to (16), while (18) will be strictly positive for any
p < 1
2
, which corresponds to current rates of law enforcement for major types of economic
crimes.
Next, using the result of Lemma 2, we derive the optimal penalty schedule.
We start by showing that it is impossible that constraint (n+2) is not binding.
In case this constraint is not binding, there are three possibilities:
1.
n−1∑
i=1
si < W and si > 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1},
2.
n−1∑
i=1
si < W and si = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1},
3.
n−1∑
i=1
si < W and si = 0 for some i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.
The result of Lemma 2 immediately implies that the solution with si > 0 for all
i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} is impossible.
Consider
n−1∑
i=1
si < W and si = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. Then the first order
conditions (6)-(10) imply that ∂L
∂s1
< 0, ∂L
∂s2
< 0, ..., ∂L
∂sn−1
< 0 . Moreover, it holds that
λ∗ = 0. This implies that (9) becomes
∂L
∂sl
=
n−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]− λnpn < 0 for all l ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.
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However, take the last period l = n− 1, then
∂L
∂sn−1
=
n−1∑
k=n−2
[Cn−2k p
n−1(1−p)k−(n−2)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]−λnpn = pn−1λn−1+npn−1λn(1−p) > 0.
Hence, condition (10) cannot be strictly negative. This implies that the outcome with
si = 0 for all i ∈ [1, n − 1] and λ∗ = 0 cannot arise as a solution of the minimization
problem of the regulator.
Next, consider
n−1∑
i=1
si < W and si = 0 for some i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. Assume sl = 0 for
l < n− 1. This means that (9) must be non-positive, i.e.
∂L
∂sl
=
n−1∑
k=l−1
[C l−1k p
l(1− p)k−(l−1)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]− λnpn < 0.
But we have just shown that
∂L
∂sn−1
=
n−1∑
k=n−2
[Cn−2k p
n−1(1− p)k−(n−2)(
n∑
i=k+1
λi)]− λnpn > 0
and, hence, using Lemma 2, we can conclude that this outcome also cannot be a
solution.
The outcome with
n−1∑
i=1
si = W and si = 0 for i < k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and sl > 0 for
l > k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} is impossible due to the result of Lemma 2.
Moreover, the outcome with
n−1∑
i=1
si = W and s1 > 0 , s2 > 0 and si = 0 for all
i ∈ {3, ..., n − 1} cannot arise. Consider s1 > 0 , s2 > 0. Using (6) and (7) we obtain
that ∂L
∂s1
= ∂L
∂s2
= 0. But this contradicts the result of Lemma 2, which states that ∂L
∂s1
>
∂L
∂s2
.
We conclude that only the following is possible: s∗1 > 0, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0 and
n−1∑
i=1
si = W , which implies that s
∗
1 = W, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0.
Finally, optimal behavior implies that only condition (n+1) on the benefits from crime
will be binding, so that λ1 = λ2 = ... = λn−1 = 0 and λn ≥ 0. Hence, the expressions
for the optimal probability of law enforcement, p∗, λ∗, and λn will be determined from
condition (n+1), ∂L
∂s1
= 0, and ∂L
∂p
= 0.
In particular, p∗ is represented as a solution of the polynomial of order n (19) with
s1 = W, s2 = 0, ..., sn = 0.
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nb−
n∑
h=1
h∑
k=1
Ck−1h−1(1− p)h−kpksk = 0 (19)
Next we present the proof of the fact that only constraint (n+1) on the benefits from
crime will be binding.
Proof. We can show that for the penalty scheme given by s∗1 = W, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n =
0, only condition (n + 1) can be binding and, hence, p∗ is found as a solution of the
polynomial of order n given in (19).
The main intuition for the proof of this result is the observation that only constraint
(n + 1) can be binding due to the construction of the problem. Assume, for example,
that constraint (l+1) is binding for some l ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}, then it follows that the LHS
of the constraint (l + 2) has to be strictly positive, which is impossible by construction
of the problem.
Now we prove this statement using rigorous mathematical tools. First, we consider
the situation where constraint (l + 1) is binding. It can be written as follows:
b − ps1 + b − p(1 − p)s1 − p2s2 + b − (1 − p)2ps1 − 2p2(1 − p)s2 − p3s3 + ....... + b −
(C0l−1(1− p)l−1ps1 + C1l−1(1− p)l−2p2s2 + ....+ C l−1l−1pnsl) = 0.
At the same time constraint (l + 2) can be written as follows
(l + 1) + b− (C0l (1− p)lps1 + C1l (1− p)lp2s2 + ....+ C llpnsl+1).
Now, taking into account that s∗1 = W, s
∗
2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0 and (l + 1) = 0, constraint
(l + 2) can be rewritten as
b− C0l (1− p)lpW = b− (1− p)lpW. (20)
Moreover, using the formula for finite geometric series and the fact that s∗1 = W,
s∗2 = ... = s
∗
n = 0, constraint (l + 1) can be rewritten as follows.
(l + 1) = bl − pW (1 + (1− p) + (1− p)2 + ...+ (1− p)l−1) = bl −W (1− (1− p)l).
Recall that constrained (l + 1) is binding. This implies that b = W (1−(1−p)
l)
l
. Now
expression for constraint (l + 2) in (20) becomes
W (1− (1− p)l)
l
− (1− p)lpW = W
l
(1− (1− p)l − pl(1− p)l)
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It is easy to show that the first derivative of this expression with respect to p is
strictly positive for any 0 < p < 1, l > 0, and W > 0. Hence, this function is strictly
increasing in p for any 0 < p < 1, l > 0, and W > 0. At the same time function
W
l
(1 − (1 − p)l − pl(1 − p)l) = 0 when p = 0. Hence, this expression is strictly positive
for any 0 < p < 1.
This proves the fact that given that constraint (l + 1) is binding, it must hold that
the LHS of the constraint (l+2) in the problem (1)-(n+1) must be strictly positive, but
this would contradict the construction of optimization problem.
End of the proof of Proposition 1.
The main intuition behind this proposition is very simple. It follows immediately
from any of the incentive constraints (3)-(n+1). The agent pays the sanction s1 with
probability p, while any further sanction will be paid with lower probability : s2 with
probability p2, s3 with probability p
3, and sn only with probability p
n. In other words,
the agent is charged s2 with probability p only if he has paid already s1 . Hence, since
paying the first fine is more likely than paying any subsequent fine, shifting resources
from the last periods to s1 increases deterrence for given p. Consequently, as in Emons
(2003), p is minimized by putting all scarce resources into s1.
Example 3 Figure 1 illustrates the proof graphically in the (p, s1)-diagram for the two-
period case. The game in this case is described as follows. A strategy of player 1 (regu-
lator) is given by σ = (p, s1, s2), while the strategy set of player 2 (offender) is given by
{0, 1, 2}.
In case n = 2, the optimization problem of the regulator will be as follows:
min p+Hk
s.t.
b− ps1 5 0 (1)
2b− ps1 − p(1− p)s1 − p2s2 5 0 (2)
s1 + s2 5 W (3)
0 < p 5 1.
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Suppose b = 0, W > 2b, s2 = W − s1.
Graphically, the solution of this problem, which has the form s∗1 = W, s
∗
2 = 0, p = p
∗,
is represented in Figure 1, where the parameter values are b = 1, W = 3.
  s1                      A 
   3                   
             
 
       
 
 
 
                                                        (1) 
 
   0               p*           (2)           1        p         
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the solution in two-period case.
The solution of the problem is represented by point A in Figure 1, with s1 = W,
s1 = 0, p = p
∗ > 0. In general, for the n-period case this diagram will be an n-
dimensional (p, s1, ..., sn−1) and the solution of the problem will be represented by the
point of the n-dimensional cone which is the closest to the vertical axis and satisfies all
the incentive constraints.
3 Optimal Sanctions if Government cannot Commit
In this section we investigate under which conditions the sanction scheme described in
Proposition 1 is sub-game perfect. This means: Does the government really implement
these sanctions once the agent has committed a crime? To do so, we study the subgame
starting when the agent has been apprehended for the first time.
In the setting, where the regulator can change its strategy once the crime has occurred,
the scheme described in section 2 will no longer be optimal. To show this we consider
the subgame starting when the agent has been apprehended for the first time. If the
government sticks to the penalty scheme described in Proposition 1, the agent will commit
the second offence for sure because it comes for free. At the same time, in this setting
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the government’s payoff is much higher in case it does not try to prevent the next period
crime, since in this way it saves on costs of control. So, clearly, an equilibrium with
the authority playing p = 0 and the agent committing the crime will be chosen in each
period after the first conviction and, hence, can emerge as an SPNE of the multi-period
repeated game. This implies that the scheme of Proposition 1 does not appear to be
a time consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for a government in an n-period setting.
Moreover, an argument given below shows that, if the government cannot commit, equal
rather than decreasing sanctions will be optimal.
Derivation of an SPNE in No-Commitment Case3
Let us consider a finitely repeated game where objective functions and participation
constraints of the players have exactly the same form as in the model of section 2.
However, here we assume that the regulator can change its strategy in any period of the
game, hence, also once the crime has occurred. The game in this case will be described
as follows. A strategy of player 1 (regulator) is given by σ = (p1, ..., pn, s1, ..., sn), while a
strategy of player 2 (offender) is given by k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n}. We also assume that agents
have enough wealth so that deterrence is always possible, i.e., nb <
n∑
i=1
si ≤ W .
Here we aim to check whether the outcome with penalty scheme set by the regulator
(pi and si for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}) such that any strategy for the firm except of strat-
egy (0, 0, ..., 0) will be blocked can arise as an SPNE of this game. Solving this game
backwards we get the following results.
Consider the optimal strategy for the antitrust authority in the last period. Irrespec-
tive of what had happen before, in the beginning of period n the anti-trust authority
solves the following problem, where pn is probability of control as before, H reflects disu-
tility of crime for the regulator, and I is an indicator function that is equal to 1 in case
3Unfortunately, we were only able to find one possible SPNE penalty scheme for which it holds
that zero-crime outcome is sustained in equilibrium. However, we believe there exist many more SPNE
penalty schemes, where some of them could have positive levels of crime in equilibrium as well. Hence,
we could not characterize in general the set of SPNEs of the game in question. That is why, we state
that the ”equal” sanctions scheme is only an example of a possible policy that can reach full compliance
behavior (k=0) in case the government cannot commit.
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crime occurs in period n and 0 in case crime is blocked,
min pn +H ∗ I (21)
s.t.
b− pnsn 5 0 (22)
s1 + ...+ sn 5 W (23)
0 5 pn 5 1. (24)
This problem shows that the primary aim of the regulator in the beginning of period
n is to block the nth period crime and this has to be achieved at the lowest possible cost.
So, at time n the regulator chooses sn and pn such that I = 0 is achieved in the period
n, but also such that the wealth that is left to the offender after the penalty sn is paid
is enough to block crimes in all the preceding periods. The I = 0 outcome in period
n is ensured if constraint (22) is satisfied. Moreover, constraints (23) and (24) on the
parameters of the penalty scheme must also be satisfied.
This implies that a possible solution of this problem has the following form: pn =
b
sn
and sn = W −
n−1∑
j=1
sj.
Looking for an SPNE, now given that we have blocked the crime in period n, we will
try to find the optimal strategy for antitrust authority in the period n − 1. Again the
solution boils down to finding the optimum of the following problem:
min pn−1 +H ∗ I (25)
s.t.
b− pn−1sn−1 5 0 (26)
s1 + ...+ sn 5 W (27)
0 5 pn−1 5 1. (28)
Which is also given by pn−1 = bsn−1 and sn−1 = W −
∑
j 6=n−1
sj.
The same solution we get for every period. Hence, in the beginning of the first period
antitrust authority again solves a similar problem:
min p1 +H ∗ I (29)
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s.t.
b− p1s1 5 0 (30)
s1 + ...+ sn 5 W (31)
0 5 p1 5 1. (32)
A solution is p1 =
b
s1
and s1 = W −
n∑
j=2
sj.
Consequently, a possible SPNE strategy of the regulator that satisfies conditions
pi =
b
si
and si = W −
∑
j 6=i
sj is given in expression (33).
si =
W
n
and pi =
bn
W
for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} (33)
In this SPNE the firm chooses not to commit any offence in any of the periods and
the regulator sets penalty and rate of law enforcement that are uniform over time.
The only condition for existence of this solution is bn < W, which is also respected in
the model of section 2.
The above analysis implies that in the repeated game setting the optimal penalty
scheme, which is the part of SPNE strategy, can be given by si =
W
n
and pi =
bn
W
for all i ∈ {1, ...n}. In this SPNE of the repeated game both penalties and rate of law
enforcement are uniform over time.
4 Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is the result that, when offenders are wealth con-
strained and the government is resource constrained and can commit to a certain policy
throughout the whole planning horizon, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather
than increasing, in the number of offenses. We prove that for the agents who may commit
an act several times, optimal sanctions are such that the fine for the first crime equals
the offender’s entire wealth, and the fines are zero for all the subsequent crimes. Since
the agent can only be a repeat offender if he has been a first-time offender, there are no
further offenses if we completely deter the first one. This conclusion completely supports
the result obtained by Emons (2003) for a two-period model.
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This result contradicts the widely prevailing escalating penalties imbedded in many
penal codes and sentencing guidelines. This puzzle still requires deep investigation in
the law and economics literature. However, we should be careful to make too strong
conclusions and policy implications on the basis of the model of Section 2, since, unfor-
tunately, analogous to Emons (2004), this scheme does not appear to be a time consistent
(subgame perfect) strategy for the government in an n-periods setting.
Finally, we suggest some extensions of the model described above. Introduction of
history dependent strategies will make the analysis more complete but at the moment
it does not seem to be analytically solvable. However, it seems that the main result,
namely a declining penalty scheme, will arise as a solution of optimization problem in
that case as well. Another possibility is to introduce the opportunity for both players
to react to the actions of the rival. This suggests to extend this model to a repeated
n-period game between the regulator and the offender. This also allows to consider the
case when full commitment is not possible and the set of strategies for the firm will
automatically include all history dependent and history independent strategies. A third
extension would be to introduce discounting. But this will only increase incentives for the
cost minimizing regulator to extract the fine as soon as possible, so that the arguments
in favor of a declining penalty scheme will be even stronger.
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